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Watching the Shop from the Front Seat: 
Determinants of Venture Capitalists’ Representation on the Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Oversight and involvement are essential for a venture capital firm to influence the 
destiny of the portfolio company. This paper focuses primarily on the venture capital 
firm’s decision to take a formal responsibility through joining the board. Our study uses 
a large sample of private British companies that received institutional investment 
between 1999 and 2002.  We examine the determinants of board composition and board 
size. Contrary to common belief, only 30% of the companies have any institutional 
investor (a “VC”) on board.   The decision to take a formal board seat is based on the 
ability to make a contribution: specifically, on the stage of the portfolio firm, the 
industry fit between the investment and the venture capital firm, and the overall 
experience of the latter. Two aspects of British venture capital firms inhibit their role in 
governance. First, firms that are organised as a public corporation (and not as a 
partnership) refrain from undertaking a formal board responsibility. Second, some of 
the more established institutions are organised around branches. We find that the  VC 
firms with branches are less involved with board membership. Finally, we report (but 
are helpless to rationalize) a sizeable number of cases in which a VC firm is represented 
on the board yet did not invest in the firm. 
 
 
 
 ii 
I. Introduction 
The venture capital (VC) industry has played a major role in nurturing and developing 
a disproportionate high share of technology commercialization and as a spawning 
ground for technology entrepreneurs (Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2003)). From 
its inception days in Silicon Valley in the 1960s, the VC industry has grown to be a 
global phenomenon with over $100 billion in investee capital in 2003 across all stages 
of corporate lifecycle, of which $33 billion is in early stage investments (MoneyTree 
Survey (2004)).1  
In addition to enhancing economic growth, the venture capital phenomenon is 
interesting from an industrial organizational perspective (Hart (2001)). In contrast to 
other financial intermediaries, the VC firm takes an active role in the development of 
the investee firm. In addition to providing funding, venture capitalists serve their 
portfolio firms through coaching and guidance, networking for strategic alliances, and 
attracting further capital (Bygrave and Timmons (1992)). Hellmann and Puri (2002) 
empirically confirm that the in-kind services of venture capitalists are of economic 
significance, through a reduction in time to bring a product to market and by 
professionalizing the start-up company to achieve organizational milestones such as 
building a management team. Information gathering and monitoring is the other key 
role played by the VC firms. Theories of financial intermediaries have focused on the 
information role of these institutions to alleviate problems of moral hazard or adverse 
selection (Fama (1985), Stiglitz (1985)). In a comprehensive study, Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003) document features of venture capital contracts and show their 
                                                 
1 In Europe alone, private equity funds raised over $40 billion in new capital  during 2003 (UBS 
Private Equity Funds Group, 2004).  
 
 1
function in mitigating information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the 
investors.2  
A key to our current scope of VC involvement is the question why investment 
and advice role should be bundled. Put another way, why cannot the entrepreneurs use 
purely paid business consultants and opt instead to use venture capital, especially 
when the entrepreneurs have to cede control and equity rights to attract the VCs. The 
rationale for  partnering with the venture capitalist is analyzed  by Casamatta (2003). 
Under a wealth constraint and costly unverifiable effort, it is not optimal for the 
entrepreneur to hire a consultant separate from obtaining the financing.  
In this paper we empirically examine the oversight role played by the venture 
capital firm in a sample of 998 British private companies that received venture capital 
investment from 1999 to 2002. It is hard to empirically gauge the effort and 
involvement of venture capital firms in their portfolio companies.3 A tangible measure 
to empirically capture the monitoring and involvement of venture capitalists is board 
membership (Hellmann (1998)). Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) show that control 
rights are a critical part of venture capital contracts. Board rights give the VC a 
regular access to information and ongoing governance over the managerial decision-
making.4 The importance of control in VC investments has also been shown in several 
other studies. Lerner (1995) posits that the need for control increases when there is 
uncertainty or turmoil in the investee firm; and selects CEO turnover as an event that 
captures uncertainty in the portfolio firm. The venture capital board membership 
                                                 
2 From an analytical perspective, Repullo and Suarez (1998) and Schmidt (2003) model the advisory 
role of the venture capitalists which gives rise to features in convertible securities used in venture 
capital financing. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show that the use of convertible securities mitigates the 
incentive of entrepreneurs to engage in window dressing practices. Cuny and Talmor (2004) analyze 
forms of stage financing in venture capital contracts under dual moral hazard and heterogeneous 
expectations. 
3 An obvious issue with surveys is that responses may only reflect the latest period or be influenced by 
recent specific events or the lack of them. Also, a survey is at best correct on average across the entire 
portfolio firms, without a meaningful differentiation across the portfolio firms. 
4 For a practitioner’s view on the role of board members in venture backed companies, and a 
comparison to their role in public companies, see Gupta (2004). 
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increases at CEO turnover in line with the prediction on the need for monitoring. 
Using a sample of IPO firms, Baker and Gompers (2001) argue that the VCs shift the 
board composition away from insiders so as to protect the interests of new investors. 
Compared to other firms at the time of IPO, VC backed firms have less insider 
controlled boards. 
Given the need for combining advice, monitoring, and investment role the 
primary research question of this paper is; why do some portfolio companies have VC 
firms’ representatives as board members and not others?  Since oversight is a costly 
activity for the venture capitalists, it should be positively related to the financial stake. 
As in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), we hypothesize therefore that where the VC 
investment is relatively low, the entrepreneur has more control as compared to 
situations where the VC investment input is higher. Second, the role of financial 
advice and help in recruiting key personnel is more important in early stage of the 
venture (Hellmann and Puri (2002)). Correspondingly, the value that the portfolio 
firm receives from the VC experience and advice is more significant in case of an 
early stage venture. We conjecture, therefore, that VCs are more likely to assume 
board positions in early stage companies relative to late stage investments. Third, the 
benefit from the VC advisory role depends on the existing skill set of the 
entrepreneur.  The lack of business acumen on part of the entrepreneur would require 
a deeper involvement. Hence, it is plausible to expect that in certain industries, 
especially science based, venture capitalists would have a higher board representation.  
Because of their non-monetary role, it would not be correct to treat the venture 
capital community uniformly and to focus exclusively on the characteristics of 
investee firm. It is possible to alleviate the cost of oversight through a mutually 
beneficial matching process between the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Lerner 
(1995) finds that geographically proximate VCs are more likely to assume a board 
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membership. Hsu (2004) shows that there is a clear eagerness among new ventures to 
affiliate themselves with high reputation investors, which translates into monetary 
terms. High reputation VCs are able to invest at a 10-14% discount. If indeed 
entrepreneurs value costly effort (service) by VCs then it follows that there may be 
some selection mechanism by the entrepreneurs based on the expected ability of VCs 
to contribute valuable services. Another research question of this paper, therefore, is 
which VC firm is selected, and in what situation to have a board representation. We 
hypothesize that VCs with prior experience are preferred (Sorenson and Stuart (2001), 
Hsu (2004)) and that the likelihood of a particular VC to monitor is linked to the fit 
between the expertise of the VC firm and the needs of the investee firm. 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that an average board size of a portfolio 
company has 6 members, of which 2.4 are venture capitalists or their representatives. 
Baker and Gompers (2001) report an average of 1.73 VCs per board at the later time 
when the venture-backed firm goes public.  This led us to presume that nearly all 
venture-backed firms have one or more VCs on their board. At least for our sample of 
UK firms, this is far from being the case. We find that only 30% of the companies 
have any institutional investor on board. Two aspects of British venture capital firms 
inhibit their role in governance. First, firms that are organised as a public corporation 
(and not as a partnership) refrain from undertaking a formal board responsibility. 
Second, some of the more established institutions are organised around branches. We 
find that the VC firms with branches are less involved with board membership.  
Our research is concerned with board structure and the decision to join the 
board at the first time the particular institution  invests in the venture. In contrast, 
prior research has focused on board structure at initial public offering  or post IPO. 
Since the majority of investee firms never reach a public offering, it limits the sample 
to very successful firms and is subjected to a survivorship bias. Second, prior research 
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treated institutional investors homogenously when examining their board 
participation. We consider industry and other expertise in assessing the benefit of 
services rendered by the venture capitalists. Third, prior research has examined the 
case of venture deals. We include in the sample both venture (start-ups) and late stage 
(buyout) investments. This allows us to capture the variance in need for oversight and 
advice across the firm life cycle. In addition, we document a very different pattern in 
the transition in board composition from the time before to the time subsequent to the 
investment round.   
We also provide descriptive information on the board structure, size and mix. 
This is relevant in the wider context of corporate governance. The general literature 
on the subject has not been able to reach an unequivocal conclusion on the role and 
impact of outside directors (Bhagat and Black (1999)). Much has been written in both 
the popular press and in academic literature on the limited role of outside directors 
(e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)). We provide systematic empirical evidence 
from private venture-backed firms in U.K. that expand our knowledge of governance 
beyond that in public corporations. Since oversight is a heavy burden, it need not be 
carried out by every participating institutional investor.5 Therefore, it is imperative to 
consider the possible consequences of round syndication, as well situations where 
there is already an institutional investor on board when a new VC firm decides to in 
the venture company. We develop the notion of VC quasi affiliates and consider their 
role in monitoring and advising. Finally, we document a significant proportion of 
cases in which a VC firm is represented on the board yet did not invest in the firm.  In 
light of the heavy cost in monitoring, this result is a puzzle to us. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 describes the data 
collection and construction. It also defines the variables of board composition. 
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Finally, it defines the variables and their construction for company, round and 
institution characteristics. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of board size and board 
mix of insider and institutional investors. Section 4 analyzes the choice by investor to 
utilize resources and take a formal board representation as a function of fit between 
the investors and the portfolio company. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Description of data and board structure 
2.1   Sample collection and construction 
Private corporations in U.K. are subject to filing and disclosure that is far more 
extensive than in the Unites States. The UK offers therefore a rich environment to 
study the governance of private firms. For this study, data was gathered from two 
primary sources. The first source, VentureXpert provides information on private firms 
that received funding from institutions and identifies these investors.6  The second 
source, FAME Information Services Database, collects filings from the Company 
House (U.K. regulatory authority). Pertinent to this study is complete information on 
individual board members that allows us to match it with VentureExpert data on the 
universe of venture capital partners and associates.7 Coverage of the U.K. private 
company board information by Fame is partial before 1998, and therefore the sample 
period for this study was selected to be from 1999 to 2002. During the four years, 
there were 2,093 firms receiving institutional financing. We only considered entities 
that were registered as companies and dropped partnerships, sole traders and other 
non-company form of entities. This left us with 1,014 registered companies that 
received institutional financing in the sample period.8 Further 16 cases were dropped 
                                                                                                                                            
5 It is commonly believed that venture capitalists spend about 40% of their time in monitoring portfolio 
firms (Sahlman (1990)). 
6 We use the terminology of institutional investors to allow for both components of institutional private 
equity – venture capital and buyout firms. 
7 Specifically, directorship information in FAME includes name, appointment date, resignation date, 
address, date of birth, and other board seats held in the past five years. 
8 In the subsequent analysis we run a sensitivity check to ensure that there is no sample selection bias. 
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because of for lack of sufficient information on board membership, resulting in a final 
sample of 998 firms. The funding in our sample was provided by a total of 213 
institutions, each doing between 1 and 163 investments.  
Venture capital is commonly placed through multiple rounds of investments. 
Individual financing rounds are documented by VentureXpert but they do not seem to 
carry equal weight for the purpose of corporate governance. This study is concerned 
only with board structure at the time when the VC firm made its investment in the 
firm for the first time. We capture the board structure prior, changes, and post the first 
time a firm receives investment in our sample period. Clearly, this need not be the 
first round of institutional money for the venture firm. Another consideration is that 
private equity investments are often syndicated, i.e., have more than one investor in 
the financing round.  The presence of multiple investors in a round results in the 1220 
unique pairings of investors and investee firm dyads. The dyads consist of investors 
who invest in a firm for the first time in the sample period. To track board evolution 
around the time of investment, we are concerned with board structure both the number 
of directors and the nature of the change. We thus employ four measures: prior, 
additions, subtractions, and post round. Directors appointed within three months after 
the financing round date are treated as additions. The three-month period also takes 
care of the over statement of rounds or spurious rounds ( Gompers and Lerner 
(2000)). In addition, there are cases where the funding may have been contingent 
upon appointment to the board, and so we also treat as additions cases where the 
directors were appointed within 60 days prior to the completion of the financing 
round. Directors removed during three months before or after the round are treated as 
subtractions. Any director who is appointed within three months prior to the round 
date and has not been removed within three months of the round is treated as part of 
the prior structure. Any prior director who has not been removed or any new 
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additions are part of post round board structure.9 In other cases where the firm was 
registered as a limited company subsequent to the receiving institutional financing we 
take the first board as the post round board. All other directors who are appointed well 
before the round date and continue past three months of the round are treated as part 
of pre and post round board structure 
Directors are coded into three primary categories common in the corporate 
governance literature: Insider, Quasi Insiders and Outsiders (e.g., Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). Insiders are employees of the firm, quasi insiders (also known as 
“grey”) have an ongoing relationship with the firm but do not work for it full time, 
such as lawyers or accountants. Outsiders include investors (institutional directors), 
angels, others, and affiliated directors. Institutional directors are identified if they 
meet both the criteria: i) self-declaration of the director as an institutional investor, 
and ii) our matching of the last and first names with the VentureXpert list of 
employees of the institutional investors. Directors are classified as Angels if they meet 
one of the two criteria: i) based on self-declaration by the board member as a VC or 
an investment manager, where such a person is not employed by one of the 
institutional investor; or ii) board membership of two or more firms receiving 
investment in our sample and not classified as an insider, quasi-insider, or 
institutional director. The next group, Affiliates, are directors who are not employees 
of, but are assumed to be closely related to one of the institutional investors who have 
invested in the round. These are business professional, scientists or industry experts 
who are viewed trustworthy by the institutional investor to qualify and oversee the 
portfolio company on their behalf.  We categorize individuals as such if they sit on 
board of at least two firms receiving investment from the same institutional investor. 
                                                 
9  Several firms in the sample were incorporated only after receiving institutional financing. For such 
firms the first board structure is classified as post round structure. 
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The final category of outside directors is Others which includes the remaining 
directors who are not classified as either Insider, Quasi Insiders or Outsiders. It 
should be noted that for about 15% of the directors there was insufficient information 
to ascertain their exact classification. They do not classify themselves as angels or 
investors and based on the register of the employees of the global venture capital 
community they were not institutional investors either (and obviously not Quasi 
Insiders). We assumed them to be insiders.10 
 
2.2  Board composition 
Table 1 provides aggregate statistics on board membership at the time of institutional 
investment. Panel A is the total count of directors at prior, additions, subtraction, and 
post round board by class of association. Data is presented separately by the stage of 
the firm. We make a distinction between a venture deal and a buyout. An investee 
firm is classified as a venture deal if it involves a seed start-up, early stage, expansion 
or mezzanine VC financing (constitutes 62 percent of the sample) based on the 
information provided by VenturExpert.  The firm is classified as buyout for a mature 
company, usually in need for a turnaround or expansion (the remaining 38 percent of 
the sample). Panel A1 presented the count of directors for the 617 venture 
investments, whereas Panel A2 summarizes the data for the 381 buyout deals in the 
sample.  The total count of directors is divided in Panel B by the number of investee 
firms in each category to arrive at the mean number of board members per company. 
 
                                                 
10 We repeated the tests in the study by treating the persons whose association and occupation are 
unknown as a separate category. The results (not reported) are found not to be qualitatively different. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 We observe an overall 43% increase in the board size around the time of the 
investment (from a total of 3911 to 5585 directors). For venture deals the average 
board size increases from 4.23 to nearly 6 seats. However the majority of the increase 
is in the insider category (nearly four seats) and in quasi insiders (.88). Only 249 
institutional investors occupy a board seat post round, for an average of 0.4 
directorship seats. Affiliated outsiders only add 0.06 to this figure. A particularly 
peculiar phenomenon is that 41 institutional investors serve on boards yet do not 
invest in the companies in the round nor do so subsequently in the sample period.  
When compared to 249 institutional directors who are from VC firms that invest, this 
is a very large number, which raises the question: are the VC employees in U.K. firms 
making optimal use of their time and effort?          
The average board size (5.94) of a venture firm in our study compares very 
well with previous literature using US data. Baker and Gompers (2001) find an 
average board size of 6.21 for their sample of IPO firms. Hochberg (2003) reports an 
average of 6.08 directors in a sample of post IPO venture firms. Finally, Lerner 
(1995) reports for biotech firms a board size 4.1 to 5.7 depending on the round. On 
the other hand, our findings of VC board representation compared very poorly with 
the results from the studies in U.S. Even with non-investing VCs and VC affiliates the 
UK average figure only increases to 0.53 seats post round.  By contrast, Lerner (1995) 
reports an average of 1.4 board seats at time of first round and 2.12 in later round per 
investee firm. Hochberg (2003) finds the average board representation to be 1.64 and 
Baker and Gompers (2001) report 1.73 VC directors per board. In the sections below 
we discuss some of the causes for the low board membership by U.K. institutional 
investors. 
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Now consider buyout deals, the average board size prior and post round is 
nearly a full person smaller than the respective figures for venture deals. Institutions 
comprise an even smaller percentage of the board (only .22 seats on average post 
investment). However, we notice an addition of 2.22 insiders to the board. By the 
nature of investment in turnaround situations, these new insiders must by appointed 
by the new investors or with the consent of new investors. In addition to a board seat 
these executives also take an active position with the company, appear on the payroll 
and therefore being classified as insiders.      
It is also of interest to analyze the subtractions from the board. 186 insiders are 
removed from the board in traditional VC deals (which amount to 10% of their pre-
board number), whereas 329 (or over 30%) insiders are subtracted in a buyout. In 
addition, the majority of the quasi insiders are also replaced (60%). This result 
highlights the core difference between a buyout transaction and a venture deal. 
Buyouts are built around a radical change in the acquired firm, which typically 
involves a sweeping removal of many of the old guard.  In contrast, retaining the 
intellectual property is crucial in venture investments and the nature of the transition 
to professionalize the company is done in a cooperative and progressive way. 
 
2.3  Company, round and institution characteristics  
In analyzing the determinants of board structure, we are concerned with three classes 
of variables: characteristics of the investee firm, the type of round, and the 
characteristics of the institutional investor. In what follows we define the main 
variables and the way they are computed.  
In line with the discussion above, we make a distinction between a traditional 
venture deal and a buyout transaction. Venture Deal is an indicator variable to capture 
this categorization. Companies are also characterized based on their industry focus. 
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We employ the 3-catogery coding used by Venture Expert: biotechnology, 
information technology (such as hardware, software, chips, telecommunication, 
internet) and traditional industries (service, retail, automotive, etc.). Our sample 
consists of 128 biotechnology companies, 432 in information technology and the 
remaining 438 are classified as traditional industries. In the empirical analysis we use 
traditional industry as the comparison category against Biotechnology and 
Information Technology firms.  
Rounds are classified based on four parameters. RdNUM  is the count of the 
number of times the investee firm received institutional financing. For example, a 
count of 2 means that although the specific observation is the first time for the 
institution to invest in the firm, the latter has already received one previous round of 
institutional funding. RD Synd is an indicator variable if there are more than one 
institutional investor in the round. RD INVS denotes the actual number of institutional 
investors in the round. Finally, Rd Amt is the total U.S. dollar amount in millions 
invested by all the participants in the round. This figure is viewed as sensitive by 
institutions and so it is not always disclosed. The total round amount per se is of little 
interest; as the more relevant variable is the level of commitment by the specific 
institution. Since this is confidential information, we assumed that all the institutions 
in the round participated equally. Accordingly, Rd Amt is normalized by dividing by 
the number of investors in the round. To further scale this variable we must 
incorporate the fact that the absolute level of investment can only be judged in 
relation to the size of other investments. We compute the average amount invested per 
investor across all deals in the sample and classify each deal whether it is above or 
below the median. This results in a 3-category indicator variable: round investment 
per participant that is above the median value, below the median value, and where no 
information on round amount is available.  
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We are next concerned with the experience of the institutional investor and its 
fit with the portfolio company.11 Experience and oversight capability is measured in 
three ways12. First there is the overall experience of the venture capitalist. Venture 
capitalists develop relationships with other institutions, bankers, and business 
professionals to build a network and gain experience that are invaluable in their 
oversight of the firm. Lerner (1995) finds that a more experienced investor among the 
syndicate (measured by age) is more likely to be nominated to the board. We view 
Experience to be related to deal intensity and therefore measure it by the accumulated 
number of U.K. investments made by the institution prior to the current quarter where 
the investment is made. Second, there is a need to account for experience in the 
sector. The more deals done by the VC firm in the industry, the more capable it is to 
deploy relevant resources, exert judgment that is less dependent on external opinions. 
Institutions with such Specific Experience ought to be valued higher than that of other 
institutional investors. We define Specific Experience as the number of prior U.K. 
deals by the investor in the industry of the portfolio company. We use the 3-catogery-
industry sector coding above: biotechnology, information technology, and traditional 
industries to determine the Specific Experience. The third variable in the group relates 
to the focus of the venture capital. A large VC firm has more partners and makes 
more deal. On one dimension it is likely to have more industry-specific know-how in 
house (which is captured by the Specific Experience). However, due to its sheer scale 
it is not sure that the in-house resources be allocated to the specific investee firm. To 
adjust for that, we need to identify if the VC has an industry focus in the area of the 
investee firm. Accordingly, Industry distance is an inverse measures the fit between 
the institutional investor and the investee firm on the industry dimension. It is the 
                                                 
11 For a comprehensive discussion of these experience measures variables, see Sorensen and Stuart 
(2001).   
12 Our unit of analysis in this study is the VC firm and hence we measure experience at the VC firm 
level and not an individual level i.e. general partner experience. 
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percentage of previous investments by the institutions in industries other than that of 
the target.  
Finally, we are interested in the organizational form of the VC firm. 
Organizational form may affect monitoring in two possible ways. First, VC firms in 
the US are organized as partnerships. In Europe, some of the more established VC 
firms are organized as corporations, and may even be quoted on the stock exchange 
(e.g., 3i Group Plc in the U.K., GIMV in Belgium). Institutions that are incorporated 
may be hesitant to join the board of investee firms as it  could trigger consolidation of 
the investee firm in the financial statements of the institutional investor. Given the 
negative operational cash flow pattern in the early years of the investment, a 
consolidation is not viewed favourably. Also, as startups are destined to fail much 
more often than other companies, this may open creditors of the venture to sue the 
investors if act as formal directors.13 PLC is an indicator variable that is coded as “1” 
if the investor is organized as a Public Limited Company under the U.K. Companies 
Act.  
The last variable is Branches, which counts the number of non-head office 
branches an investor has in U.K. Past research has shown that the venture capital 
firms invest primarily in geographically proximate firms.14 John Doerr, the legendary 
partner of Kleiner Perkins is quoted to say: “you have to be able to drive to the deal.” 
There has also been anecdotal evidence that VC firms have asked early stage start-up 
to move offices close to the VC office, to enable a close oversight and intricate 
                                                 
13 3i Group PLC, which is largest investor in our sample, claims that, lacking the protection of a limited 
partnership, it may be open to lawsuits as viewed by creditors to have “deep pockets” (Hardymon, 
Lerner, and Leamon (2003)). 
14 Sahlman (1990), Bygrave and Timmons (1992), Lerner (1995) and  Sorenson and Stuart (2001). 
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relations. We suggest that branches allow investors to monitor and provide advice to 
the investee firms15.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the round type and the profile of the 
institutional investor. Mean round number is 1.16 indicating that for the majority of 
the cases the current investment is the first time. Precisely 50% of the deals are 
syndicated. The average number of investors is 2.14 (and goes as high as 12). Median 
amount of investment in a given round is $5 million dollar, but this figure is highly 
skewed. As for experience, the median of prior U.K. deals for an institution is 17. 
This figure ranges from a single deal (the current one) to 428 transactions for 3i. 
Median number of deals in the sector is 9, and again this figure is highly skewed for 
the large investors. Average industry distance is 0.38, suggesting that on more often 
than not there is an industry concentration in the deal selection. Finally, for the 
organizational structure, 22% of the deals come from PLCs. As for branches, the 
mean number is 2.41 (plus headquarters) topped by 3i with 9 branches.16   
 
3. Determinants of board structure 
In this section we study the board structure by looking at contextual features like stage 
of the investee firm, industry classification, and the attributes of the financial round. 
We are interested to know which of these characteristics affect board size and the mix 
of insider versus outside institutional directors. The latter is important, as it becomes a 
component in the distribution of control.  
                                                 
15 A more accurate measure of such function of control and advice by branches would be to measure 
the geographical distance between the nearest office of the investor and the investee firms office. We 
treat branches as a proxy. 
 15
3.1  Determinants of Board Size 
The optimal board size has been subject to ongoing debate in the literature. Although 
a large board can bring vast experience to the table, it is likely to suffer from 
coordination problems and hence not function well. A board of seven to nine directors 
has been suggested as an optimal (Bhagat and Black (2001)). Direct findings on the 
relationship between board size and performance are not conclusive. In terms of 
relevance to the current study, most of the studies on board size are conducted on 
large public companies, with a median board size of 11 directors. An exception is 
Eisenberg et. al. (1998), who study the relationship between board and performance 
for a sample of 879 midsize Finnish firms, where the median board size is 3 members. 
They report a negative correlation between board size and performance. A point of 
consensus in literature is that board size is actually an endogenous variable and is 
influenced by company characteristics such as firm size, ownership structure and the 
type of industry. 
We attempt to determine factors that influence the size of the board of firms 
receiving private institutional equity. Company and round characteristics are utilized 
as explanatory variables. The company characteristics we utilize are the two industry 
indicator variables, and the indicator variable whether this is a venture deal or a 
buyout. For the round characteristics we incorporate all the five variables that were 
discussed above. For the integer variables – round number and number of investors in 
the round, we use a natural log transformation. Finally, we incorporate year indicators 
to capture possible year fixed effects.   We run an OLS regression on board size, the 
result of which are reported in Table 3, Panel A. Since the dependent variable, Board 
Size, is a count variable that is not normally distributed, we run a Poisson regression, 
                                                                                                                                            
16 Large institutions with branches are represented more often in the sample. Since the median number 
of branches across all transactions is one, the average number of branches across the 213 institutional 
investors in the sample is clearly less than one.       
 16
which we report in Panel B of the table. The results are consistent across the two 
models. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We find support for the hypothesis that firms in a venture stage have greater 
need for monitoring and advice  hence the entrepreneur and the institutional investors 
will prefer a higher board size. We find that the Venture Deal indicator has a relative 
high and significant coefficient (0.825), indicating that venture deals on average have 
nearly a director more than buyout deals.17 We also find that the biotechnology 
industry is more likely to have a nearly one board member more than a traditional 
industry. In line with the hypothesis that oversight is related to the financial stake is 
borne out by the data through the variables, RD_AMT variables and by the 
investment round (RDNum). When the investment is above the median  board size is 
larger by one director as compared to   when round amount is below the median. 
Similarly as the number of institutional financing rounds progresses, valuation is 
typically increased and so the number of board members. Finally the presence of more 
than one investor (RD Synd) also leads to larger boards as investors are driven to 
monitor. No support is only found for the count of investors (RD INVS).  
 
3.2 Board Composition 
We next turn to examine the board mix, in particular corporate insiders and 
institutional investors. The independence of the board from the insiders is viewed as 
the first line of defence in protecting shareholder interest and as a key driver of 
performance. However data and arguments have been mainly concerned with publicly 
traded companies, for which individual shareholders are assumed to be largely 
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uninvolved and in need for protection. The situation in private firms is dramatically 
different for the following reasons: 
a. Board control is only one of several instruments that external investors have to 
exert discipline on management. As is documented by Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2003), in venture backed firms voting rights and board seats are two distinct 
mechanisms. Much of the term sheet involves stipulations and milestones that 
allow external investors to intervene in numerous situations (in particular, when 
the investee company is not performing well).  
b. Venture backed companies are dependent on the institutional investors to facilitate 
the next round of financing, which acts as an implicit whip in the boardroom. 
c. Unlike in most public corporations, insiders in venture companies have a higher 
stake, either through their initial ownership position as founders or through 
generous executive option schemes. This makes founders in particular less prone 
to entrenchment compared to executives in a public corporation.  
d. As discussed extensively in Section I, institutional board members of a venture 
firm are more typically more heavily engaged than their counterparts on public 
corporate boards. Monitoring is only one of several functions that they serve. 
 
For all the reasons above, a direct comparison of private to public board structures 
could be misleading.  In benchmarking our findings, therefore, we will concentrate on 
the (sparse) corporate government literature in venture capital.  
As shown in Table 1 insiders account for 67% of all board members in venture 
stage firms and 80% of all board members in buyout stage firms. Even aside of the 
quasi insiders, it indicates that insiders dominate the board in our sample. In line with 
the discussion above, we speculate two main reasons. First, insider directors have a 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Unlike the OLS coefficient that is the marginal effect of increase of one unit in the dependent 
variable, the Poisson coefficient measures the log odd change.  
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larger ownership stake – either in the capacity of founders in venture companies or if 
the deal is a management buyout. Second, in other buyout deals it is often the case 
that the institutional investor appoints an experienced professional to run the company 
on their behalf and to execute a turnaround or an expansion plan. Such an 
appointment is usually supplemented with a board seat and at times even the 
chairmanship.  
Other studies of board structure in private firms were mainly concerned with 
successful late stage U.S. ventures around an IPO. Hochberg (2003) finds that on 
average insiders make 42% of the directors. We note that most of our data refers the 
first round of institutional investment. Thus the difference is likely to be attributed to 
the company stage and the subsequent rounds financing until a successful IPO. In the 
process outsiders gain more seats on the board. Even if insiders keep their existing 
seats, percentage-wise they get diluted not only in equity but also in the boardroom.  
We next turn to explore the determinants of board mix post the financing 
round. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest that the board composition is an 
outcome of the bargaining process between insiders (CEO) and outsiders based on the 
relative power of the different parties.18  We consider several contextual variables that 
could affect the mix of insiders and institutional investors on the board. The same 
variables are used as the ones to explain board size in Table 3. As there, we include 
fixed effects to capture any unobserved year effects. The proportion of insider 
directors and VC directors are regressed and reported in Panels A and B of Table 4, 
respectively. Since the dependent variable is bounded in the range [0,1], we also 
estimate a logistic regression (unreported), in which the direction and significance are 
qualitatively the same. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Casamatta (2003) argues that insiders of early stage firms have to give up 
control to attract investors who can provide oversight. In line with her proposition, we 
find that Venture_Deal is significantly negatively related to insider proportion. In the 
board size estimation (Table 3) Venture_Deal was positively correlated with board 
size, implying a tendency to increase the board by adding experienced professionals. 
Similarly, firms that receive a large inflow of capital (RD_AMT higher that the 
median amount) have a lower insider ratio post round. Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2003) have suggested that in an industry where greater fixed investments are made or 
where entrepreneurial talent is specific there is more need for outsider oversight. This 
is particularly relevant in biotechnology as scientists most often have a very low base 
of commercial skills. We find that the ratio of insider is significantly negative in the 
biotechnology industry when compared to traditional industries. 
In Panel B, we analyze the determinants of the proportion of institutional 
directors. It is not very surprising that the results are consistent with Panel A 
pertaining insiders. We find that Venture Deals have a higher mix of institutional 
board members. Also, as the number of rounds progresses (RDNum), the proportion 
of institutional board members increases; and finally, the institutional board 
membership is also higher in case of biotechnology as scientists or physicians may 
lack business acumen. 
 
 
4.  Determinants of institutional board representation 
As outlined in Section 1, studies on the board structure of US venture backed report 
an average of two VC investors on the board of each of their portfolio companies -- 
either directly or through syndicate partners. For the U.K. we have shown that 
institutional investors are not represented on majority of the investments. Figure I 
                                                                                                                                            
18 Tenure of the CEO increases the CEO power in board appointments. 
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summarizes the statistics.  Out of the total 998 UK firms, only 299 have any 
institutional representation on their board. Of which 33 investee firms have 
institutional employees of firms that never invests. The investing institutions serve on 
boards of only 27% of the portfolio companies. When adding the 35 boards occupied 
by outsider affiliates, this figure only grows to 34%. As for the remaining venture 
backed companies, 10% have an angel on their board, and the vast majority (56%) are 
housed by insiders and non-professional investors.  
[Insert Figure I about here] 
The statistics displayed in Figure I raises several queries. For the institutional 
investors, how are they picking on which of their portfolio companies to server on 
board and why? We seek to explain the decision of the VC firm to serve on boards of 
portfolio companies first based on the needs of the latter company. We conjecture that 
an early stage company is in need for more oversight. The variable Early stage is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 when the stage of the investee firm at the round date 
is either “early stage” or “start-up/seed”. Second, we account for the outlay of 
resources by the investors in terms of capital invested (RD AMT), and the size of the 
potential stake (proxied by the round number (RdNum). Since monitoring is presumed 
to be rather costly, we are also interested in the impact of round syndication, and 
whether it alleviates the burden by sharing the oversight. Two variables account for 
that: an indicator variable in case of a syndicated round (RD Synd), and the number of 
round participates (RD INVS). 
Just as the institutional investor decides to allocate costly time and effort to 
some investments, the firm that raises the fund may also be seeking institutional 
investors with the best ability to serve its needs. It is of mutual interest therefore for 
both the investor and firm to maximize their fit. We account for general experience 
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and fit between the institutional investors and the portfolio company through the 
variables Experience, Specific Experience, and the Industry Distance between the 
investee firm and the investor’s entire portfolio. 
Table 5 provides  clues to the VC allocation of time and effort and the fit 
between the ability of the investor and needs of the investee firm. We estimate a 
Probit model on the likelihood that the investor will serve on board of the investee 
firm. When deploying the statistical procedures, we account that we have started with 
a population 2,093 firm receiving investment and end with a sample of 998 firms. 
Sample selection may bias our results and therefore we use the two-stage Heckman 
(1979) sample selection correction. Also, the number of investments per investor 
ranges in our sample between 1 to 163 investments. Sampling the same investor 
multiple times results in non-independent observations. To control for this, we use the 
cluster option in STAT 8.0 by grouping on the investor.19  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 supports the hypothesis that an institutional investor is more likely to 
serve on board of an early stage venture (Early Stage deal provides a nearly 10% 
increase in the marginal probability). They are also more likely to serve on board if 
the amount invested is above the median amount. In terms of round characteristics, 
we observe no statistically significant effects. 
We turn next to experience and fit. More experienced investors are more likely 
to serve on board. On the other hand, we find the level of Specific Experience to be 
negatively correlated to board membership, which is not intuitive. As to the fit 
                                                 
19 Using investor fixed effects would have controlled for any unobserved time invariant factors that 
may influence the decision to monitor. In an unreported analysis we model the proportion of portfolio 
firms in which the VC servers on board  using investors fixed effects and find the results to be similar. 
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between the VC and the needs of the firm, it is reassuring to find out that investors are 
unlikely to monitor firms that are distant from their prior expertise. 
Over the course of this study we have come across two interesting variables 
that seem to have an influence on an investor choice to serve on board. First is the 
organizational form. Most of the venture capital firms in U.S. are structured as limited 
partnerships. In contrast, some of the more established and rather active U.K. 
institutional investors are organized as public limited companies. Most notably, 3i 
Group PLC is the single largest investor in our sample (see Figure II for key 
highlights). As discussed above, members of a PLC form of institutional investors 
may be less likely to serve on board due to consolidation and litigation concerns. In 
Table 5 we find the main effect of PLC negative but not statistically significant. 
However we show below that there is a significant interaction between branches and 
PLC when explaining board participation. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The second variable is the prevalence of branches for the institutional 
investors in U.K.; studies confirmed that venture capital investment in the U.S. is 
highly localized in terms of geography and industry distance.20 There is high 
concentration in a few areas in the East and West Coast of U.S. due to the 
geographical constraints the VCs place on their investments. In the last decade, 
venture capital activity has spread to many other parts of the U.S. Nevertheless VC 
firms refrain from operating through branches. They prefer partnering through 
syndication of investments, which allows them to expand their network both in 
geography and by industry. In U.K. despite the fact that the geographically dispersion 
is much smaller that the continental U.S., we observe that a significant number of the 
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institutional investors have branches. A reading of the history of the institutional 
investors reveals that the firms are founded as quasi government agency with a 
mandate that may include balanced regional development (3i group Plc for example). 
In other cases firms are associated with established commercial and investment-
banking  that operate through branches. We expect that these branches serve as a 
proxy for the distance and monitoring capability of the institutional investor. This is 
supported by Table 5. Institutional investors with branches are less likely to serve on 
boards and investors who are both PLC and have branches are further unlikely to 
serve on board. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Theory and empirical evidence of venture capital investment in the U.S. has lead one 
to assume that private equity investors serve on boards of their entire portfolio 
companies either directly or through syndicate partners. We have presented evidence 
in the U.K. context to show that is not the case. Since time is considered the binding 
constraint of venture capitalists, its allocation on advice and oversight across the 
portfolio firms is very important. We find that the institutional investors choose to 
serve on boards of investee firms where they add most value in early stage and when 
the entrepreneurs are less likely to have business acumen (e.g., in the biotechnology 
industry). The institutional investors are also more likely to serve on boards where 
they have a high financial stake. The more experienced the investor the more likely 
that he/she will serve on board of the investee firm. While these results are sensible, 
we cannot easily square it with the sheer number of institutional investors who sit on 
boards of companies they did not invest in (nor do so later). 
                                                                                                                                            
20  Bygrave (1987), Lerner (1995), Sorenson and Stuart (2001).  
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 More generally, exerting oversight over portfolio companies may take several 
forms: through active participation such as through a committing directorship 
position, through the institutional branches through affiliated professionals and 
through syndication. This study explicitly considers all the four mechanisms. The 
study examines the rather European feature of the U.K. institutional investing, i.e. the 
number of branches and the organizational form of the institution. Unlike the nearly 
uniform partnership model in the U.S., we find a number of active VC investors who 
are organized as PLCs. 3i Group Plc., the largest investor (163 investments) does not 
have any board membership in the sample period. This raises a question, does the 
organization form determine whether the investor partake in costly monitoring and 
advice role? Moreover, this phenomenon is quite perplexing as implies that such 
institutions essentially free ride on their syndicate partners.  We find that the 
institutions with branches are less likely to undertake board responsibility. We 
conjecture that the branches serve as an alternative monitoring and advice mechanism. 
In further work, we intend to refine the branches measure to capture the distance in 
miles between the nearest branch of the investor and the location of the investee firm. 
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Figure I: Board Membership
Institutional Investors
27%
Affiliates
4%
No Professional Investors
56%
Institutional employees of 
firms that did not invest
3%
Angels
10%
Investor Type Number of Investee Firms
Institutional Investors 266
Affiliates 35
No Professional Investors 564
Institutional employees of firms that did not invest 33
Angels 100
Total 998
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Figure II: 3i Group PLC Summary 
3i Group Plc is the largest single investor in our study it accounts for 163 
investments. 3i was founded in 1945 as a quasi government agency to alleviate the 
equity gap for medium and small firms. It has 9 branches in U.K. and 33 branches in 
total worldwide.  Below are the pie charts of the 163 investments by syndication, 
industry sector, and stage of the investee firm. 
 
 
 
 
Syndication
Syndicated
44%
Not Syndicated
56%
 
Industry Sector
Traditional
37%
Bio Tech
17%
Information tech
46%
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Stage
Venture Deal
62%
Mature Deal
38%
Table 1 
Composition of the board of directors 
 
Summary statistics of the board structure for 998 UK firms that received institutional funding between 
1999-2002. Directors are classified into 3 primary categories Insider, Quasi Insiders and Outsiders. 
Board structure is classified as pre, additions, subtractions, and post round based. Panel A is the count 
of directors by association; subdivided into A1 and A2 which are traditional venture capital investments 
and buyout investment, respectively. Panel B is the count of directors divided by the number of 
traditional venture capital investments and buyout investment, respectively; to arrive at the mean 
number of board members. 
 
 
 Panel A1  Panel A2 
Panel A: Count of Board Members Venture Deal (617 investee firms)  Buyout Deals (381 investee firms) 
 Association Pre Addition Subtractions Post  Pre Addition Subtractions Post
Insiders 1826 811 186 2451  1010 844 329 1525
Quasi Insiders 403 224 84 543  219 113 133 199
Outsider: Institutional Investors (invests) 113 143 7 249  13 73 1 85 
Outsider: Institutional Investors (no investment) 25 19 3 41  4 9 2 11 
Outsider: Angels 85 101 12 174  25 38 14 49 
Outsider: Other 133 50 12 171  24 23 11 36 
Outsider: Affiliated 22 18 1 39  9 8 5 12 
Total 2607 1366 305 3668  1304 1108 495 1917
 Panel B1  Panel B2 
Panel B: Average Board Composition Venture Deal (617 investee firms)  Buyout Deals (381 investee firms) 
 Association Pre Addition Subtractions Post  Pre Addition Subtractions Post
Insiders 2.96 1.31 0.30 3.97  2.65 2.22 0.86 4.00
Quasi Insiders 0.65 0.36 0.14 0.88  0.57 0.30 0.35 0.52
Outsider: Institutional Investors (invests) 0.18 0.23 0.01 0.40  0.03 0.19 0.00 0.22
Outsider: Institutional Investors (no investment) 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.07  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Outsider: Angels 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.28  0.07 0.10 0.04 0.13
Outsider: Other 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.28  0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09
Outsider: Affiliated 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.06  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Average board size 4.23 2.21 0.49 5.94  3.42 2.91 1.30 5.03
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of investment round and investor profile 
 
Summary statistics of the investments rounds and investor profile for 1,220 cases of 
investment by institutional investors in 998 U.K. private companies between 1999-2002. 
RdNum is the number of times an investee firm received financing from institutional 
investors, including the current round. Rd Synd is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
there are more than one investor(s) in the round. RD INVS is the number of investors in the 
round. Rd Amt ($000) is the total round amount. Experience is the number of prior 
investments made by the investor. Specific Experience is the proportion of prior investments 
by the investor in the industry of the investee firm. Industry Distance is the 1 minus the 
proportion of prior investments in the investee firm industry. PLC is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the institutional investor in the transaction is a U.K. public limited 
corporation. Branches are the number of U.K. branches the institution has outside its main 
office. 
  
 
Variable Name 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Min. Max. 
RdNum 1220 1.16 0.53 1 1 7 
RD Synd 1220 0.50 0.50 1 0 1 
RD INVS 1220 2.14 1.68 2 1 12 
Rd Amt ($mil)   963 20 109 5 0 2205 
Experience 1220 60.66 104.79 17 1 428 
Specific Experience 1220 26.69 43.37 9 1 200 
Industry Distance 1220 0.38 0.29 0.38 0.00 0.99 
PLC 1220 0.22 0.41 0 0 1 
Branches 1220 2.41 3.38 1 0 9 
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Table 3 
Regressions of Board Size 
 
OLS and Poisson Regressions to explain the number of directors on the board (Board Size) 
for a sample of 998 UK firms that received institutional funding between 1999-2002. The 
independent variables are Venture Deal which is an indicator variable for traditional VC 
investment. RdNum is the number of times an investee firm received financing from 
institutional investors, including the current round. Rd Synd is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if there are more than one investor(s) in the round. RD INVS is the number of 
investors in the round. Industry of the investee firm is classified as a 3-category indicator 
variable (biotechnology, information technology and traditional industry). The comparison 
group is the traditional industry. Round Amount is 3-category indicator variable of round 
amount averaged per participant. The two dependent variables are: Above the Median value, 
and where No Information on round amount is available. The comparison group is the 
category of investments with round amount below the median value. Panel A is OLS 
regression and Panel B is a Poisson regression both with robust corrected standard errors. 
Indicator variables for the year are used but not reported for brevity. 
 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression; Dependent Variable: Board Size 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-ratio
Venture Deal 0.825*** 4.7
RdNum  1.252*** 4.7
RD INVS  0.169 0.6
RD Synd 0.677** 2.2
Biotechnology 0.858*** 3.63
Information technology 0.402** 2.33
RD AMT Above Median 0.570*** 3.35
RD AMT No Info 0.312* 1.88
Constant 3.691*** 19.72
Number of observations=1220 Adj. R-sqr = 17.6 F-stat = 23.66
 
Panel B: Poisson Regression; Dependent Variable: Board Size 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-ratio
Venture Deal 0.149*** 4.71
RdNum  0.182*** 4.89
RD INVS  0.020 0.46
RD Synd 0.128** 2.62
Biotechnology 0.142*** 3.71
Information technology 0.071** 2.3
RD AMT Above Median 0.098*** 3.32
RD AMT No Info 0.057* 2.02
Constant 1.367*** 37.69
Number of observations=1220 Pseudo R-sqr = 4.0 Wald Chi-square = 282.48
*, **, *** indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.001 level respectively 
  a natural log transformation of the variable 
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Table 4 
Proportions of insider and institutional investor directors post 
financing round. 
 
The dependent variables are the proportion of insiders and the proportion of institutional 
investors of 998 U.K. private companies that received institutional funding between 1999-
2002. The independent variables are Venture Deal which is an indicator variable for 
traditional VC investment. RdNum is the number of times an investee firm received financing 
from institutional investors, including the current round. Rd Synd is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if there are more than one investor(s) in the round. RD INVS is the number of 
investors in the round. Industry of the investee firm is classified as a 3-category indicator 
variable (biotechnology, information technology and traditional industry). The comparison 
group is the traditional industry. Round Amount is 3-category indicator variable of round 
amount averaged per participant. The two dependent variables are: Above the Median value, 
and where No Information on round amount is available. The comparison group is the 
category of investments with round amount below the median value. Indicator variables for 
the year are used but not reported for brevity. 
 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression; Dependent Variable: Proportion of Insiders 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-ratio
Venture Deal -0.116*** -6.6
RdNum  -0.029 -1.35
RD INVS  -0.051** -2.02
RD Synd 0.023 0.78
Biotechnology -0.062** -2.7
Information technology -0.021 -1.24
RD AMT Above Median -0.002 -0.12
RD AMT No Info -0.008 -0.48
Constant 0.876*** 43.14
Number of observations = 1220 Adj. R-sqr = 12.1 F-stat = 16.72
 
Panel B: OLS Regression; Dependent Variable: Proportion of Institutional Investors 
Independent Variables Coefficients T-ratio
Venture Deal 0.044*** 4.21
RdNum  0.041** 2.57
RD INVS  0.057*** 3.66
RD Synd -0.029 -1.63
Biotechnology 0.048** 3.19
Information technology 0.013 1.26
RD AMT Above Median 0.000 0.01
RD AMT No Info 0.016 1.57
Constant 0.056*** 4.41
Number of observations = 1220 Adj. R-sqr = 9.5 F-stat = 10.50
*, **, *** indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.001 level respectively 
  a natural log transformation of the variable 
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Table 5 
Choice model of venture capitalist decision to serve on board of investee firm 
 
This table is a Heckman corrected Probit choice model for the decision of institutional investor to serve 
on board of an investee firm. The estimation analyzes the choice between by investors to monitor in 
1,121 cases21 that received institutional funding between 1999-2002. The dependent variable for the 
model is the presence of the particular institutional investor on board of the investee firm post the 
investment round. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the investor has 
representative on board post the financing round. Early Stage, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for a round classified as “early stage” or “startup/seed”. RdNum is the number of times an 
investee firm received financing from institutional investors, including the current round. Rd Synd is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there are more than one investor(s) in the round. RD INVS is 
the number of investors in the round. Experience is the number of prior investments made by the 
investor. Specific Experience is the proportion of prior investments by the investor in the industry of 
the investee firm. Round Amount is 3 category indicator variable where the comparison group is the 
category of investments where the round amount is below the median value. Industry distance is the 
variable that captures the fit between the investor and the industry of the investee firm. PLC is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the institutional investor is a public limited corporation. 
Branches are the number of U.K. branches an investor has. PLC*Branches is the interaction between 
Branches and PLC where the variable takes a value of 1 or more when an investor is both a PLC and 
has Branches.  
 
Panel A: Probit Regression22; Dependent Variable: On Board23 
Independent Variables 
Marginal Increase
In Probability Coefficients Z-ratio
Early Stage Deal 0.095*** 0.481*** 0.000
RdNum  -0.035 -0.202 0.413
RD INVS  -0.013 -0.073 0.644
RD_Synd 0.003 0.016 0.934
Experience  0.082** 0.474** 0.031
Specific Experience  -0.065** -0.377** 0.045
RD AMT Above Median 0.067*** 0.433*** 0.001
RD AMT No Info -0.024 -0.140 0.245
Industry Distance -0.166** -0.964** 0.032
PLC -0.050 -0.328 0.102
Branches -0.015** -0.086** 0.043
PLC*Branches -0.038** -0.218** 0.003
Constant -0.563 0.088
Observations =1121             Pseudo R2= 0.1131  
*, **, *** indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.001 level respectively 
  a natural log transformation of the variable 
 
 
                                                 
21 Which does not include 99 cases where the institutional investor has an employee on board prior to 
the financing round 
22 The figures in the parenthesis are the model t-statistics. The standard errors for the model are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity using White’s robust correction in Stata 8.0. The non-independence of 
the institutional investor is corrected by cluster the standard errors of an investor using the cluster 
option in Stat 8.0. The model p-value reports the joint significance of the co-efficients of the 
independent variable. The Pseudo-R2 =1-Log L/log Lo is the maximized value of the log-likelihood 
function; where the log Lo is the log likelihood computed only with a constant term. N is the number of 
observation, which is 1121. 
23 The Hazard variable, which is the two-stage correction for sample selection, is included but not 
reported. The variable is not significant. 
